Post by Steve Gardner on Nov 26, 2007 15:19:22 GMT
... and The Strategy of Tension
This, the third in a five part series, originally appeared here - THE ALL-SEEING i
On March 12th 1947, US President Harry S Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and spoke about the need to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”
Thus he encapsulated the ‘Truman Doctrine’; ostensibly a defensive containment policy aimed at limiting the expansion of Communism in post-war Europe. Truman subsequently signed the National Security Act of 1947, restructuring both the military and Intelligence communities, and creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
“I never heard of [Operation Northwoods]. I can’t believe the chiefs were talking about or engaged in what I would call CIA-type operations.” – Robert McNamara, Defense Secretary to President John F Kennedy
Initially, the CIA was responsible for psychological warfare. According to the National Security Council, “[t]he similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations.” Some within the Intelligence community had argued for a wider remit, including the reintroduction of the offensive covert paramilitary capability that had served the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), so well during World War II. Although the National Security Act did not explicitly authorise such activities, it did contain a catch-all clause, allowing the CIA to ‘perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.’ This rather ambiguous authority, coupled with the fact that the CIA had control of unvouchered funds, gave the organisation some latitude and meant that not all projects or project costs need be subject to Congressional scrutiny.
However attitudes hardened when, in early 1948, the Communist party seized political control in Czechoslovakia. National Security Council Directive 10/2 was introduced. It broadened the CIA’s responsibilities and established The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The OPC was given direct access to both the State Department and the military without being required to work through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy. This revised mandate for the first time explicitly authorised the CIA to plan and conduct covert operations…
“…the United States, for generations, has sustained two parallel but opposed states of mind about military atrocities and human rights: one of U.S. benevolence, generally held by the public, and the other of ends-justify-the-means brutality sponsored by counterinsurgency specialists. Normally the specialists carry out their actions in remote locations with little notice in the national press. That allows the public to sustain its faith in a just America, while hard-nosed security and economic interests are still protected in secret.” - Robert Parry, investigative reporter and author
Operation Gladio (and, ultimately, the Strategy of Tension) has its roots in the Truman Doctrine. Against a background of post-war poverty in Europe, Communism began to flourish. Communist parties enjoyed considerable electoral success, even in Western states such as Italy and France, where it became the largest single party. In response, Truman’s original pledge of military assistance to Europe was augmented by the Marshall Plan. NATO was also formed around this time, superseding the Treaty of Brussels. These developments prompted the US Department of State to undertake a review of US strategic policy and military programmes. The resulting plan, NSC-8, was signed by Truman in 1950 and signalled a shift from passive to active containment.
NCS-68 contrasted the fundamental purpose of America, which was to ‘assure the integrity and vitality of our free society’, with the Soviet’s perceived goal of bringing about ‘the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin.’
It further argued that ‘
Operation Gladio was originally conceived by Allen Dulles, who went on to become the first civilian Director of the CIA. It was the Italian code name given to NATO’s clandestine stay-behind armies, which were left across Europe after the war to better train partisan groups to counter the threat of Communist expansion. Initially, these armies were coordinated solely by the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) until, upon the orders of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), a second command centre was formed in the shape of the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC).
These stay-behind armies later became key backers in what was known in Italy as the Strategy of Tension. This right wing, anti-Communist programme was aimed at preventing the increasingly popular Italian Communist Party from participating in a governing coalition. It lasted for over a decade. Throughout the campaign, Gladio members employed both violent and non-violent methods to manipulate public opinion against the Party, often committing false flag attacks and then blaming them on Communist insurgents. These were conducted indiscriminately against both civilian and non-civilian targets, and included the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, the 1972 Peteano car bombing, the attempted assassination of former Interior Minister Mariano Rumor and the 1980 Bologna massacre.
Gladio first came to light in August 1990, when then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti gave testimony to a Senate subcommittee investigation into terrorism in Italy. Andreotti revealed that the secret army had been hidden within the Defence Ministry as a sub-section of the SISMI and its predecessor, the SOIS, Italy’s military secret service. This revelation infuriated the former Director of SIOS, Vito Miceli, who had “gone to prison because I did not want to reveal the existence of this super secret organization.” An organisation, which according to Vincenzo Vinciguerra, one of the 1972 Peteano car bombers, was required to “attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown people far removed from any political game [in order to force] the public to turn to the state to ask for greater security.” Subsequent investigations have since revealed that Gladio-style armies also operated in Belgium (SDRA8), Denmark (Absalon), Germany (TD BJD), Greece (LOK), Luxembourg (Stay-Behind), the Netherlands (I&O), Norway (ROC), Portugal (Aginter), Switzerland (P26), Turkey (Counter-Guerrilla), Sweden (AGAG), and Austria (OWSGV).
Following these disclosures, the European Parliament issued a Joint resolution condemning Gladio.
An Italian Senate report published in 2000, found that ‘[t]hose massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported…by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence.’
You can read more about NATO’s stay-behind armies in Daniele Ganser’s book, ‘NATO's secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe.’
This, the third in a five part series, originally appeared here - THE ALL-SEEING i
~~~~~
On March 12th 1947, US President Harry S Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and spoke about the need to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”
Thus he encapsulated the ‘Truman Doctrine’; ostensibly a defensive containment policy aimed at limiting the expansion of Communism in post-war Europe. Truman subsequently signed the National Security Act of 1947, restructuring both the military and Intelligence communities, and creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
“I never heard of [Operation Northwoods]. I can’t believe the chiefs were talking about or engaged in what I would call CIA-type operations.” – Robert McNamara, Defense Secretary to President John F Kennedy
Initially, the CIA was responsible for psychological warfare. According to the National Security Council, “[t]he similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations.” Some within the Intelligence community had argued for a wider remit, including the reintroduction of the offensive covert paramilitary capability that had served the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), so well during World War II. Although the National Security Act did not explicitly authorise such activities, it did contain a catch-all clause, allowing the CIA to ‘perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.’ This rather ambiguous authority, coupled with the fact that the CIA had control of unvouchered funds, gave the organisation some latitude and meant that not all projects or project costs need be subject to Congressional scrutiny.
However attitudes hardened when, in early 1948, the Communist party seized political control in Czechoslovakia. National Security Council Directive 10/2 was introduced. It broadened the CIA’s responsibilities and established The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The OPC was given direct access to both the State Department and the military without being required to work through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy. This revised mandate for the first time explicitly authorised the CIA to plan and conduct covert operations…
…which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorised persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Covert action shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.
“…the United States, for generations, has sustained two parallel but opposed states of mind about military atrocities and human rights: one of U.S. benevolence, generally held by the public, and the other of ends-justify-the-means brutality sponsored by counterinsurgency specialists. Normally the specialists carry out their actions in remote locations with little notice in the national press. That allows the public to sustain its faith in a just America, while hard-nosed security and economic interests are still protected in secret.” - Robert Parry, investigative reporter and author
Operation Gladio (and, ultimately, the Strategy of Tension) has its roots in the Truman Doctrine. Against a background of post-war poverty in Europe, Communism began to flourish. Communist parties enjoyed considerable electoral success, even in Western states such as Italy and France, where it became the largest single party. In response, Truman’s original pledge of military assistance to Europe was augmented by the Marshall Plan. NATO was also formed around this time, superseding the Treaty of Brussels. These developments prompted the US Department of State to undertake a review of US strategic policy and military programmes. The resulting plan, NSC-8, was signed by Truman in 1950 and signalled a shift from passive to active containment.
NCS-68 contrasted the fundamental purpose of America, which was to ‘assure the integrity and vitality of our free society’, with the Soviet’s perceived goal of bringing about ‘the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin.’
It further argued that ‘
ractical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.
’ Such was the zeitgeist into which Operation Gladio was born.Operation Gladio was originally conceived by Allen Dulles, who went on to become the first civilian Director of the CIA. It was the Italian code name given to NATO’s clandestine stay-behind armies, which were left across Europe after the war to better train partisan groups to counter the threat of Communist expansion. Initially, these armies were coordinated solely by the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) until, upon the orders of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), a second command centre was formed in the shape of the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC).
These stay-behind armies later became key backers in what was known in Italy as the Strategy of Tension. This right wing, anti-Communist programme was aimed at preventing the increasingly popular Italian Communist Party from participating in a governing coalition. It lasted for over a decade. Throughout the campaign, Gladio members employed both violent and non-violent methods to manipulate public opinion against the Party, often committing false flag attacks and then blaming them on Communist insurgents. These were conducted indiscriminately against both civilian and non-civilian targets, and included the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, the 1972 Peteano car bombing, the attempted assassination of former Interior Minister Mariano Rumor and the 1980 Bologna massacre.
Gladio first came to light in August 1990, when then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti gave testimony to a Senate subcommittee investigation into terrorism in Italy. Andreotti revealed that the secret army had been hidden within the Defence Ministry as a sub-section of the SISMI and its predecessor, the SOIS, Italy’s military secret service. This revelation infuriated the former Director of SIOS, Vito Miceli, who had “gone to prison because I did not want to reveal the existence of this super secret organization.” An organisation, which according to Vincenzo Vinciguerra, one of the 1972 Peteano car bombers, was required to “attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown people far removed from any political game [in order to force] the public to turn to the state to ask for greater security.” Subsequent investigations have since revealed that Gladio-style armies also operated in Belgium (SDRA8), Denmark (Absalon), Germany (TD BJD), Greece (LOK), Luxembourg (Stay-Behind), the Netherlands (I&O), Norway (ROC), Portugal (Aginter), Switzerland (P26), Turkey (Counter-Guerrilla), Sweden (AGAG), and Austria (OWSGV).
Following these disclosures, the European Parliament issued a Joint resolution condemning Gladio.
A. having regard to the revelation by several European governments of the existence for 40 years of a clandestine parallel intelligence and armed operations organization in several Member States of the Community,
B. whereas for over 40 years this organization has escaped all democratic controls and has been run by the secret services of the states concerned in collaboration with NATO,
C. fearing the danger that such clandestine network may have interfered illegally in the internal political affairs of Member States or may still do so,
D. whereas in certain Member States military secret services (or uncontrolled branches thereof) were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime as evidenced by, various judicial inquiries,
E. whereas these organizations operated and continue to operate completely outside the law since they are not subject to any parliamentary control and frequently those holding the highest government and constitutional posts are kept in the dark as to these matters,
F. whereas the various 'Gladio' organizations have at their disposal independent arsenals and military resources which give them an unknown strike potential, thereby jeopardizing the democratic structures of the countries in which they are operating or have been operating,
G. greatly concerned at the existence of decision-making and operational bodies which are not subject to any form of democratic control and are of a completely clandestine nature at a time when greater Community cooperation in the field of security is a constant subject of discussion,
1. Condemns the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks and Calls for a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organizations or any splinter groups, their use for illegal interference in the internal political affairs of the countries concerned, the problem of terrorism in Europe and the possible collusion of the secret services of Member States or third countries;
2. Protests vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network;
3. Calls on the governments of the Member States to dismantle all clandestine military and paramilitary networks;
4. Calls on the judiciaries of the countries in which the presence of such military organizations has been ascertained to elucidate fully their composition and modus operandi and to clarify any action they may have taken to destabilize the democratic structure of the Member States;
5. Requests all the Member States to take the necessary measures, if necessary by establishing parliamentary committees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organizations active in this field, and at the same time to monitor their links with the respective state intelligence services and their links, if any, with terrorist action groups and/or other illegal practices;
6. Calls on the Council of Ministers to provide full information on the activities of these secret intelligence and operational services;
7. Calls on its competent committee to consider holding a hearing in order to clarify the role and impact of the 'Gladio' organization and any similar bodies;
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Secretary-General of NATO, the governments of the Member States and the United States Government.
An Italian Senate report published in 2000, found that ‘[t]hose massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported…by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence.’
You can read more about NATO’s stay-behind armies in Daniele Ganser’s book, ‘NATO's secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe.’
